I am following the developments on your last article captioned “As Senegal Proposes 148 Vehicles For Trans-Gambia, Jammeh Deploys Troops To Farafenni- Showdown Imminent?” The story reminds me of Jammeh’s crude but discreet diplomatic approach to the ever-lingering crisis generated by the MFDC nuisance within the region.

Lt. Col. Sheriff Samsudeen Sarr

 I have in my book “Coup D’etat By The Gambia National Army”, treated the subject of President Jammeh’s covert and overt positions towards the conflict, two un-identical and seriously troubling positions that should be of major concern to both belligerents in the conflict. In short, I could definitively state that The Gambia government or Jammeh in particular would never be heard making public statement in support or against the MFDC’s quest for total independence of Cassamance; yet, in private he could swear to President Wadda his support to the Senegalese government to stop the rebellion by all means necessary and possible while in the comfort of his sound-proof Kaninlai bedroom he would hold Salifu Sajo by the hand and tell the rebel leader “I am all in support of your course to the bitter end.”

So when I saw the story of the Senegalese Minister Hon. Farba Senghore declaring August 30 as the day of implementing what was portrayed as an emergency measure aimed at alleviating an urgent transportation crisis facing Senegalese passengers, I told myself this is de-je-vous all over again. The meeting held in Dakar last week to brief mainly the Transport Unionists in the presence of Ambassador Gibril Joof highlighted among other things, an embarrassing but pitiful position of a diplomatic envoy whose tongue is directly wired to Jammeh’s fingers. Joof is not stupid to be uttering such clearly stupid statements of commercial vehicles employed to help desperate Senegalese passengers traveling from north to south Senegal as security threats to The Gambia. His failure to act or speak the way he is instructed from Kaninlai, however stupid it might sound or look to him would automatically put his job in jeopardy. He would be dictated to talk or brace up for the electric broom so feared by almost all Gambians serving under Jammeh, especially the political heavyweights like Joof.

The embarrassing treatment suffered by Joof at the meeting showed that his invitation there was not to ask for his permission or opinion but merely to inform him of an already sealed Executive decision. However, looking at the stipulated line of action and its scope-148 commercial vehicles, Senegalese soldiers and police plus the possible involvement of French troops based in Dakar- I am inclined to believe that the Senegalese authorities would not have taken such a unilateral decision of implementing the action without first consulting the government of The Gambia. The probability of that happening would have dawned on me if the two countries were at a state of hostility too serious to disallow Wadda and Jammeh from dealing with each other directly. That as far as I know is far from the realities.

I would once again say it. Senegal, I could attest, would not be involved in an operation of such a magnitude that affects The Gambia without the two governments coming into an agreement over the plan. Leaning on my past experience as a one-time high ranking official of the Jammeh government, I would stand by this theory until it’s proven otherwise: I believe the Senegalese authorities after coming up with the emergency contingent plan might have asked President Wadda to directly speak to Jammeh about it on their “hotlines”. Yes, like all Heads of State they certainly enjoy the magic convenience of those “hotlines” where they could treat matters of urgency behind the scenes but on some concrete official grounds. Wadda would do his part accordingly, but knowing my friend Jammeh, he would handle the call, as he would usually do when the agenda revolves around the MFDC rebels. He would be the only person who matters in his government disregarding opinions of others, even his Vice President in that first critical moments after picking up the handset from the cradle. In such cases, his mood would sometimes dictate his action or reaction. If not the mood swing, the person on the other side of the line usually plays a great part in his decision making. Anyway, if Wadda is the caller which I think happened in this case, going by my experience the likelihood is that Jammeh would have initially agreed to whatever the man had asked for until their dialogue is over and the deal all sealed. For Wadda he would take the matter back to the appropriate channel of government activities and let the officials affected continue the process accordingly.

Jammeh on the other hand would perhaps sleep over the issue alone before waking up to start asking for reasons on the subject already approved with empty threats of taking drastic actions if the Senegalese plan was implemented. Then I think that was where he thought of poor Mr. Gibril Joof and the next intriguing drama remotely controlled from his backyard in Banjul or Kaninlai. Now that the Senegalese have gone into full action as pledged with transports being escorted by armed guards, Jammeh I suspect will be sending contradictory messages on two different lines-one to Wadda assuring him his unwavering support on the operations and the other to Joof asking him what he is doing to warn the Senegalese of the growing danger from their action. As the days go by, Joof will therefore, continue to be a source of laughter with every statement of his making him look like a clown in confusion. This in fact might be Joof’s final days on the job, because I might be wrong, but I really think he is quietly telling the MFDC hotheads that it was his Ambassador in Dakar who created the entire mess. 

I have noticed in Joof’s statement the mention of deploying the GNA to Farafenni in a bid to confront the Senegalese forces but nothing relating to that was confirmed or disputed in Banjul. The GNA already have a sizable force in Farafenni but for them to go confrontational to the Senegalese troops is predictions that even Ambassador Joof in his private moments would view as unrealistic. The poor fellow must be wishing that his nightmare in the case would end as soon as possible. My advice to him at this moment is somewhat simple and candidly religious: let him faithfully flow with the waves of the confusion and perhaps try the Touba Mosque for a special prayer for the almighty God to help him through these troubling times.